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Abstract: The focus of this paper is on the study of the drivers of a cross market 
arbitrage profit. Many papers have investigated the risk of trading arbitrage 
opportunities and the empirical existence of these events at the high frequency level 
for different markets. But none of the previous work has asked the simple question of 
how these events are formed in the first place. That is, what are the drivers behind the 
occurrence of a risk free profit opportunity? In this paper we investigate the 
theoretical (and empirical) implications of a cross platform arbitrage profit. Following 
a microstructure model we show that this event is the result of microstructure frictions 
in trading. We are able to decompose the likelihood of an arbitrage opportunity into 
three distinct factors: the fixed cost to trade the opportunity, the level of which one of 
the platforms delays a price update and the impact of the order flow on the quoted 
prices (inventory and asymmetric information effects). In the second (empirical) part 
of the paper, we investigate the predictions from the theoretical model for the 
European Bond market with an event study framework and also using a formal 
econometric estimation of a probit model. Our main finding is that the results found in 
the empirical part corroborate strongly with the predictions from the structural model. 
The event of an arbitrage opportunity has a certain degree of predictability where an 
optimal ex ante scenario is represented by a low level of spreads on both platforms,   a 
time of the day close to the end of trading hours and a high volume of trade. 
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Introduction 
The subject of this paper is the investigation of the drivers behind an arbitrage 
opportunity. A pure arbitrage event exists when the market quoted prices imply the 
existence of a riskless profit opportunity. For our case, this is related to a cross market 
arbitrage. For an example, consider two distinct physical venues located one next to 
the other that sell and buy cars (two car dealers).  Dealer number one buys a particular 
type of car
4
 for 
1
BidP  and sells it for 1
AskP  while dealer number two buys the same type 
of car for 
2
BidP  and sells it for 2
AskP . This is similar to the case we want to investigate 
where there are two alternative order books. 
5
 
Consider now the existence of an arbitrageur who pays enough attention to all four 
prices displayed by the dealers. The arbitrageur knows that if he can buy cars at a 
price lower than the price at which he can instantly sell it, then he will always lock in 
a profit. This operation is relatively riskless as long as the operation is quick enough 
to close the second leg of the trade (a sell) before the dealers update their prices once 
again. But, there are hidden costs to this operation. First there is a funding issue as the 
arbitrageur will have to come up with the resource for the first leg of the transaction (a 
buy). Second there are delivery costs since he/she will also have to transport the 
goods to the next shop for each transaction. Finally, there are search and transaction 
costs as this arbitrageur will have to check prices in each dealership and pay for 
commission and taxes. For simplicity, we will further assume that these costs are all 
insignificant. 
This arbitrageur will have positive net profits for the situation where either 
1
AP  is 
lower than 
2
BP  or 2
AP  is lower than 1
BP . The profit of this operation will be higher the  
higher is the divergence between the quoted prices in the two dealerships. This is the 
case of a negative spread event. Remember that spread is the difference between the 
ask and the bid price. If we aggregate this dual market by retrieving the best available 
quotes, that is, finding the highest bid ( ( )1,2 1 2max ,Bid Bid BidP P P= ) and the lowest ask (
( )1,2 1 2min ,Ask Ask AskP P P= ), we will see that the arbitrage event will be true when 
1,2 1,2
Ask BidP P−  (a.k.a. the spread) is negative.  If a dealer continues to quote the same 
prices, the arbitrageur will continuously trade the arbitrage portfolio and his/her 
wealth will grow at a constant rate. 
From the point of view of the dealers, the quoted prices are still plausible as the ask 
price is always higher than the bid, and therefore as they buy and sell cars there is still 
a positive expected compensation per round trip trade. These dealers may or may not 
know about the operations of the arbitrageur. Since this arbitrageur is simply buying 
and selling cars, he/she is still bringing business to the dealerships so his/her trading is 
commercially beneficial. From the price side, these managers are reactive to the 
number of cars that they hold in stock. The value of automobiles in this particular 
region is very uncertain and the value of the dealer’s stocks can decrease or increase 
in an unpredictable way. The dealers are aware of this unpredictability and they do 
                                                 
4
 Prices are therefore inelastic. 
5
 An order book displays the best bid price, which is the best price an aggressive seller can get at a 
particular point in time and also the best ask price, which is the best price an aggressive buyer can 
reach. 
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not appreciate it as their business is not speculation (they are risk averse). Every time 
which there is a number of cars in stock higher than a particular threshold, the owners 
will lower the ask prices in order to motivate the incoming of buys, which will further 
decrease their level of price exposure. If this decrease of price is not also true for the 
other shop, it may happen to trigger an arbitrage opportunity. The  arbitrageur will 
come in and trade at the specific prices until the inventory level of the shops is once 
again at a comfortable level.  
Therefore, as you can see, the arbitrageur is actually performing a service to the shops 
since he/she will always trade when the arbitrage bounds are broken. This service 
takes the form of helping the dealers to manage their level of exposure. The 
compensation for the trader is then driven by the mismanagement of inventory by the 
dealers. An optimal solution for the dealer’s inventory problem would be to open a 
trading channel with his competitor. If the car dealers could trade among themselves, 
they would always get better prices than trading with the arbitrageur. This exchange 
would be beneficial for both sides as the inventory problem can occur in both venues. 
In this case it is likely that the trader would cease its arbitrage operations as the 
opportunities would no longer be observed. 
This example shows some of the dynamics we can expect in a multi platform market. 
The point we are making from this simple situation is that there is a driver of a cross 
market arbitrage profit. For the scenario in question it is particularly the excessive 
inventory sustained by one of the shop’s owners. But we could also argue that an 
arbitrage opportunity would be likely if one of the shops has a relative delay
6
 in 
updating the prices of cars with respect to the other.  
While the fictional case of the car arbitrage is compelling, the situation is far more 
complex in the real world. First there are time varying degrees of uncertainty 
regarding the true price of an asset. If news about a risk factor hit the market (e.g. 
default of Greek bonds), this will also impact the other countries. So, if price 
variability is changing, we can argue that the threshold over which the market makers 
manage their inventory exposure is also time varying.  
Second, there are multiple dealers that come and go in the market, each with 
particular restrictions on their activity
7
. This makes the analysis far more complicated 
as their identity (and inventory) is not usually traceable in empirical data. Third, the 
dealers can hedge their inventory by trading in the opposite direction for a particular 
risk factor instead of being forced to improve quotes for decreasing inventory 
exposure. For example, the market maker for a three year fixed coupon bond of 
Germany can partially hedge his inventory exposure to the interest rate by trading the 
five (or more) year fixed coupon bond of the same country. Therefore, for the cases 
where there are other instruments with similar risk exposures, the empirical effects of 
inventory management cannot be fully assessed with trades and quotes data for a 
single asset. 
                                                 
6
 For instance we could imagine the situation where each shop’s owner receives the price of cars by 
calling a central supplier in each 1 and 10 minutes respectively. The owners then set the bid and ask by 
respectively subtracting and adding half the spread from this price. Depending on how much the prices 
move in each time interval it can happen that the delay in updating the quotes will portray an arbitrage 
opportunity. This is the slow price adjustment scenario provided in (Harris, 2003). 
7
 Here we refer to commercial restrictions (e.g. provide competitive quotes for a significant part of the 
trading hours). 
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Fourth, these are electronic platforms and prices are fully disseminated so that the 
market maker on one platform knows the prices being quoted on the other. For some 
cases the dealers can trade on both. The speed (and sophistication) of trading is also a 
factor. One of the risks in arbitrage trading is the execution of the trades. If prices are 
moving fast the quoted values may slip away from the arbitrage boundaries and an 
arbitrage trader may actually be forced to sustain a loss if he/she cannot trade at the 
previously quoted values. Also, the market makers in the present day are well 
equipped with state of art software and hardware. These are justified by competitive 
forces since a dealer would be better prepared to make markets if he/she can react 
quicker and more efficiently to the observed news and order flow. This also applies to 
quote control, where, given an overview of the whole market, a computer can always 
check whether a cross market arbitrage was created or not. 
As the reader can see, the analysis of an arbitrage opportunity in real cross markets is 
far more complex than the two shops example in the first part of the introduction. But, 
while the details are different, we still have the same intuition that a cross market 
arbitrage opportunity is motivated by well-known microstructure effects such as the 
impact that a trade has on the quotes
8
 and the price update delay. In this paper we are 
interested in analyzing what are these drivers in a more formal approach. With the 
support of a microstructure model we are able to show quantitatively the effects of the 
trade impact and also how the delay of a quote update in one of the platforms with 
respect to the true price can create arbitrage opportunities. In the empirical part of the 
research we analyze cross market arbitrage events for the Italian bond market. The 
results are quite positive as there is considerable evidence which corroborates the 
predictions from the theoretical part. 
The paper is organized as follows. First we briefly present a review of the previous 
work on the subject, second we show the theoretical derivations behind a pure 
arbitrage profit for a multi platform framework. In the third part we describe the 
methods used to test the implications from the theory. We follow with an analysis of 
the results and we finish the paper with the usual concluding remarks. 
 
Literature Review 
The subject of arbitrage has attracted a significant amount of attention from the 
academic community. The concept of arbitrage opportunities impacts financial 
theories in a set of branches, from efficient market hypothesis
9
 to pricing theorems
10
. 
A significant proportion of the literature has focused on showing that arbitrage trades 
are in fact risky. These are segmented into four types: fundamental, synchronization, 
noise trader risk and execution risk. 
The first is the simplest, fundamental risk. When engaging arbitrage trades for similar 
(but not equal) assets, there is a risk that an exogenous factor impacts the value of the 
arbitrageur’s portfolio. For example, consider an arbitrage for an ADR instrument 
                                                 
8
 For the example of the car dealers this was the inventory management effect. But trades can also 
impact the quotes by the information asymmetry effect, in which the intuition is that there are traders 
with privileged information, therefore changes in the efficient price are correlated to a portion of the 
order flow, which, given that the quotes are a function of efficient price, results in another source of 
positive covariance between quotes and the trades.  
9
 See for example (Malkiel, 2003). 
10
 See for example (Hull, 2002) 
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regarding a Brazilian company (e.g. Petrobras). The price of Petrobras in the Brazilian 
equity market (Bovespa) is cheap comparing to the price of the ADR traded on the 
NYSE. A fundamental arbitrageur with access to both markets places a long position 
for the undervalued Brazilian stock in Bovespa and a short for the NYSE ADR 
instrument. The logic is that since both assets have the same cash flows, then the 
observed price difference between Bovespa and NYSE is mean reverting and should 
eventually return to zero. It is clear that both assets have similar exposure to the same 
risk factors (e.g. international oil prices). But, given that the ADR is traded in the US, 
it implies a whole new set of local risks which cannot be hedged by the Brazilian 
asset. Therefore, a part of the portfolio of this arbitrage trader will be exposed to a 
different set of country specific risks, including exchange rate risks. For more details 
see (Gagnon & Karolyi, 2004). 
The second type of risk in an arbitrage operation is the synchronization risk (Abreu & 
Brunnermeier, 2002). This is the risk that arbitrageurs face when competing for 
similar arbitrage opportunities. Rather than correct the market instantaneously, the 
uncertainty regarding the time it would take for the market to correct itself in a 
fundamental basis forces the arbitrage trader to time the arbitrage in order to minimize 
holding costs of his operation. While it is clear that the market portrays an arbitrage 
opportunity, the arbitrageurs simply doesn’t know when the market will be back in 
equilibrium, resulting in a synchronization cost for the trader. 
The synchronization risk is related to (but distinct
11
 from) to the noise trader risk, 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) and (Bradford De Long, Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann, 
1990). The disequilibrium of fundamentals in the market can last for a time longer 
than expected if noise traders are clustered on one side of the trade. These noise 
traders are investors with erroneous beliefs about the true price of an asset. If by 
chance there is a high proportion of these noisy investors on one side of the market, 
the traded prices may actually move further away from fundamentals
12
 instead of 
converging, which is the expected behaviour. Therefore, the existence of noise traders 
creates another set of risk for an arbitrage trader. This rational trader with wealth 
constraints could then be forced to liquidate a position with a loss even thought his 
fundamental analysis is correct.  
The last set of risks is the execution risk (Kozhan & Tham, 2009). Since arbitrage 
usually involves more than one asset, then there is a chance that the trader is not able 
to fill all trades required to complete the arbitrage portfolio. This risk will increase as 
the higher is the required amount of trades to complete the portfolio and the higher is 
the number of traders competing for the same arbitrage opportunities. For further 
details see the previously mentioned paper. 
On the empirical side of arbitrage research, many studies have shown that arbitrage 
opportunities do exist for different markets. But, when accounting for real world 
costs, these opportunities do not seem very attractive. For example a significant 
proportion of the studies were focused on the interest rate parity in exchange rate 
markets. One of the first papers to show that arbitrage trades exist but are likely not 
profitable when accounting for transaction costs is (Frenkel & Levich, 1975). The 
authors demonstrated that when taking into account the delay of executed trades and 
                                                 
11
 This is different from noise trader risk as it isn’t necessarily originated from traders with erroneous 
beliefs, but also on the time that other arbitrage trader will step in the market to correct the mispricing. 
12
 There is a clear example of such risk in financial history, the LTCM episode. See (Lowesntein, 2002) 
for details. 
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other transaction costs, the possible mispricing was not actually profitable for the 
empirical data (in this case Canada-US and US-UK exchange rate pairs).  
In a more recent work, (Juhl, Miles, & Weidenmier, 2006) investigate the occurrences 
of covered interest parity violations in the Gold standard period (1880-1914) against 
the evidence for the present market. As one can expect, they find a higher number of 
CIP violations for the Gold standard period when compared to the present period. 
This is explained by the fact that slower information distribution leads to a higher lag 
of price update towards the fundamental value, which causes a higher proportion of 
arbitrage opportunities to exist. 
Still in the exchange market, in the work of (Akram, Rime, & Sarno, 2008) the 
objective was to provide a descriptive study on the size, duration and economic 
significance for arbitrage opportunities in the foreign exchange market. Using tick 
data for major exchange rates (USD/EUR, USD/GBP and JPY/USD) for the period of 
February to September of 2004, the authors find that the profitable CIP deviations last 
for an average of a few minutes, which, as the authors argue, would be a short lived 
event but relatively long enough for the arbitrage portfolio to be traded. This result is 
consistent with the view that arbitrage opportunities do exist, but are rare and last for 
short time intervals. Further investigation also shows that the frequency, size and 
duration of these arbitrage opportunities are positively related to the volatility of the 
market. While the authors of this study have not discussed the reasoning behind this 
result, we argue that the positive dependency of arbitrage opportunities with respect to 
volatility is consistent with our view regarding the impact of price update delay and 
the inventory problem in the occurrence of arbitrage opportunities. For the first, if 
there is a constant delay for price updates, the higher the volatility of prices changes, 
higher the chances that quoted prices will portray an arbitrage opportunity. For the 
second, if volatility is high, the market makers will be motivated to decrease portfolio 
exposures by reducing inventory. This is accomplished with a drastic improvement of 
quotes, which may in turn also trigger an arbitrage opportunity. Therefore, the 
implications of the present study can explain some of the results found in (Akram, 
Rime, & Sarno, 2008). 
Another significant part of the literature in arbitrage opportunities has devoted 
attention to the case of futures-cash basis. As with the case of covered interest parity, 
the arbitrage relationship between a futures contract and its underlying security is 
relatively easy to check for empirical data. The authors in (Roll, Schwartz, & 
Subrahmanyam, 2007) looked at the effect of liquidity in arbitrage opportunities and 
vice versa. For example, if the markets are not liquid enough, then the futures-cash 
basis can widen, giving the chance for an arbitrage opportunity, which will then 
attract arbitrageur traders, therefore increasing liquidity. So clearly there is a feedback 
effect in this process. This paper studies this effect by performing Granger-causality 
tests between the index-futures basis and stock market liquidity. The results found are 
consistent with the feedback effect and shows that both variables Granger cause each 
other. Further research on the case of index future arbitrage can be found in 
(Mackinlay & Ramaswany, 1988), (Henker & Martens, 2001), (Cummings & Frino, 
2007), among many others. 
As one can see, much of the literature is concerned with an ex post analysis of the 
economic aspects of arbitrage opportunities including profitability and riskiness. Our 
interest in this paper is with the ex ante implications of this event, that is, which 
factors are triggering arbitrage opportunities. In this perspective, we approach an 
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arbitrage opportunity as a stochastic event driven by exogenous processes. In terms of 
contribution to the literature, we do not claim to be the first to point out the role of 
microstructure frictions in arbitrage opportunities
13
. But, we seem to be the first to 
provide a formal analysis of it. Next we present the theoretical part of the paper where 
we describe the implications of a cross market arbitrage in a microstructure model of 
prices and trades. 
 
Theoretical Foundations 
In this section we are interested in showing the theory behind pure inter-platform 
arbitrage profits. First, we set up a structural microstructure model and then we 
investigate the conditions for an instantaneous arbitrage profit to exist. We start our 
derivations with a structural model for a multiplatform trading framework. This is 
based on a multi-asset model
14
 with inventory management and asymmetric 
information effects. In our case, we have one underlying asset, which is traded on two 
different platforms. The efficient price is the same across trading venues but inventory 
effects and trading costs are different. The efficient price process is given by: 
 
1t t t tm m uθν−= + +         (1)  
 
This equation represents the true price of an asset, which will follow an extended 
random walk process. The main innovation in the formula is given by tu , which is an 
i.i.d. random variable with zero expectation, constant variance and zero covariance at 
any lag. It is easy to prove that the price change for a price process with a formula 
such as (1) is not predictable
15
. For Equation (1), the term tθν  measures the 
information asymmetry effect where tν  is the unexpected order flow. The idea in this 
effect is that a portion of the traders have privileged information such that their order 
flow is correlated to the true price of an asset. For example, consider a trader with 
insider information on particular news for time t. This investor will then buy the asset 
before the news becomes public and will subsequently see an improvement in prices. 
This translates into a positive correlation between order flow the efficient price, which 
is being measured by parameter θ . 
The structural equations for quotes, inventories and trades will have their own version 
for each platform. For platform 1 we have: 
 
1, 1 1, 1t t tq m b I −= −    
     (2) 
1, 1, 1 1,t t tI I x−= −    
     (3)  
1,t tx λν=          (4)  
1
1, 1, 1,
2
t t t
c
p q x= +
   
     (5)  
                                                 
13
 For instance see page 373 of (Harris, 2003) and the first paragraph of (Roll, Schwartz, & 
Subrahmanyam, 2007). 
14
 See (Hasbrouck, Modeling Market Microstructure Time Series, 1996) for details. 
15
 For more information regarding properties of a random walk model, see (Hasbrouck, Empirical 
Market Microstructure: The institutions, economics and econometrics of securities trading, 2007). 
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For platform 2: 
 
2, 2 2, 1t t k tq m b I− −= −         (6)  
2, 2, 1 2,t t tI I x−= −         (7)  
( )2, 1t tx λ ν= −          (8)  
2
2, 2, 2,
2
t t t
c
p q x= +         (9)  
 
The above equations define the time varying evolution of the quotes, inventories, 
order flow and traded prices respectively, in each of the platforms. Parameters ib , ic  
for i=1,2 are all positive and λ  is between zero and one. The quote equation, formula 
(2), is related to the efficient price at the same time plus a reaction to the inventory 
which the market maker is facing. The higher the value of b , the higher the increase 
(decrease) of the mid quote with respect to a negative (positive) level of inventory ( tI
). That is, if the past inventory is positive, there will be a downwards improvements in 
the quotes, which will motivate the arrival of buy trades, which will then decrease the 
level of inventory of the dealer. Therefore the parameter b  in Equations (2) and (6) 
represents the sensitivity of the market maker to inventory imbalances. The inventory 
process for the microstructure model is given by a random walk representation where 
the innovation is the negative of the exogenous trades, which is itself a random 
component. Remember that if a buy trade comes in, it is actually a sell trade from the 
dealer side and it will decrease his inventory, which justifies the negative sign in (3) 
and (7). 
The order flow of the structural model is represented by tν , an i.i.d. random 
component uncorrelated at any lag
16
. This is an exogenous process and is split across 
the trading platforms given a value
17
 of λ . A proportion of this order flow is 
correlated to the efficient price given the information asymmetry effect. Such an 
effect is being measured by parameter θ . The higher is the value of θ , the higher is 
the proportion of informed trades in the order flow and higher is the covariance 
between the quote price changes and the trades. It is important to point out that given 
the microstructure model presented before, there are two ways that a trade can affect 
the quotes. The first is the inventory management in each of the platforms and the 
second is the information asymmetry effect. Both effects will affect quoted prices in 
the same direction but the temporal drivers are different as the inventory effect is 
                                                 
16
 Some remarks should be made with respect to the process underlying the order flow. In general it 
would be more realistic to assume that the order flow has a mean reverting component of the type 
( )1 1, 1 1t tq mα − −− − , where 1α  is the reaction of traders to the mispricing of the asset. This is more realistic 
than assuming a totally random process. But, ignoring such mean reverting effects does not change the 
main point of this derivation, which is to show that arbitrage opportunities are the result of 
microstructure frictions. Given that, we chose to keep the simpler case with an exogenous process for 
order flow, which makes the following derivations far more tractable.     
17
 This parameter is bounded by zero and one. 
8 
 
driven by the lagged order flow and the informational asymmetry effect is driven
18
 by 
the contemporaneous trade. 
The prices at which a trade takes place will be given by Equations (5) and (9). If one 
unit of a buy trade reaches the market, the actual traded price will be  
2
t t
c
p q= + . If 
one unit of a sell trade comes to the market, the traded price will be 
2
t t
c
p q= − . The 
dealer of this round trip trade then profits from the spread, which is given by the value 
of c . This spread is set to cover the trading costs on the market maker side (e.g. 
clearing, processing and management costs). The dynamic process portrayed by 
Equations (5) and (9) are similar to an order book structure but there are significant 
differences. For instance, in a real order book there are minimum volumes to be 
traded. Also, the price dynamic in a real order book is discrete, meaning that price 
changes can be measured in terms of minimum price variations or ticks which are 
defined by the exchanges. These properties are clearly not true for (5) and (9) as tx  
follows a continuous distribution.  
Note that from (2) to (9) we also assume that we have a different market maker with 
different inventory needs in each trading channel. From the structural equations in (2) 
and (6) we see that the second platform lags the update of the efficient price in the 
quote equation by a value of k
19
, which is an integer higher than or equal to zero. This 
could be the case of a temporary operational failure in the affected platform, a lack of 
mismanagement by the market maker or perhaps a unique market structure such as a 
crossing market
20
, which lags the update due to processing delays. 
Now, the situation which we are interested in is the case of a cross platform arbitrage 
profit that is, buying a particular quantity φ  on the underpriced platform and 
instantaneously selling
21
 it in the overpriced market. As a starting point we use 
platform two as the venue with undervalued prices (
1, 2,t tp p> ). Using Equations (1) – 
(9), we have that the profit from the cross platform arbitrage will be given by: 
 
( )2,1 1, 2,t t tarbPL p p Cφ= − −        (10) 
 
For the last formula, ,i j
tarbPL  is the arbitrage profit for buying φ  units in platform i 
and selling it in platform j. The term C is the fixed trading cost (in cash terms) for the 
round trip trade (e.g. broker fees). For simplicity we will assume that 1φ =  , that is, 
                                                 
18
 This is not exactly evident from (2), but by substituting 
tm  in tq , it becomes clear that the trades 
will impact the quotes at a contemporaneous level. 
19
 On a side note, we could also have set the process for quotes as 
1, 1 1, 1t t j tq m b I− −= −  and 
2, 2 2, 1t t j k tq m b I− − −= −  and it would not have change the results from our derivations. The effect which 
drives the result is the relative lag from one platform to the other, which in this case is measured by k. 
20
 See page 97 in (Hasbrouck, Empirical Market Microstructure: The institutions, economics and 
econometrics of securities trading, 2007). 
21
 We are assuming that each trade is certain to be executed. This is different than the setup given in 
(Kozhan & Tham, 2009), in which the execution of arbitrage trades is uncertain. Further research could 
be taken in this direction, but we start with a simple scenario. 
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the arbitrage strategy buys and sells one unit of the asset. Further expansion of the last 
equation
22
 yields: 
 
1 1
2,1 1 2
1 1, 1 2 2, 1
0 0 2
k k
t t j t j t t
j j
c c
arbPL u b I b I Cθ ν
− −
− − − −
= =
+
= + − + − −∑ ∑    (11) 
 
The condition for an arbitrage profit will be given by 2,1 0tarbPL > . This implies that, 
in order for a profitable negative spread event to exist, the condition is: 
 
1 1
1 2
2 2, 1 1 1, 1
0 0 2
k k
t j t j t t
j j
c c
u b I b I Cθ ν
− −
− − − −
= =
+
+ + > + +∑ ∑     (12) 
 
Now, the last formula shows that given the structural equation defined earlier, there 
are three distinct components to the event of a multi platform arbitrage profit. The 
first one is simply the lag update of order k for one of the trading channels. This effect 
is given by the sum of innovations in the efficient price (terms 
1
0
k
t j
j
u
−
−
=
∑
 
 and 
1
0
k
t j
j
θ ν
−
−
=
∑  
in formula (12)). The informational shocks to the common efficient price have an 
immediate effect on the price of the first platform but affect the price of the second 
platform with a delay k. Clearly if k=0, both terms vanish and hence do not impact the 
profit of the arbitrage. The second factor is the imbalance between inventories across 
the platforms, which is driven by the terms 
2 2, 1tb I −  and 1 1, 1tb I − . For our case where the 
buy (sell) signal was generated for platform one (two), the higher (lower) the 
difference of reaction of market makers to their respective inventory, the higher the 
chances for an arbitrage profit. Exemplifying, let’s say that the market maker in 
platform two executes a big sell trade at time t-1, meaning that he bought stock and 
increased significantly his corresponding inventory level. The dealer in platform one 
has a steady inventory, with low variability. The response of the market maker for 
platform two at time t will be to lower the quotes. Depending on how strong is this 
improvement, it might be possible that the incoming of a large sell trade at time t-1 
indirectly triggers an arbitrage opportunity. Note also that this effect is relative to the 
misbalance in between platforms. The variable in question is the distance between 
2 2, 1tb I −  and 1 1, 1tb I − , which is a mix between the previous inventory and also the 
reaction level of the market makers. The last component of the condition is the trading 
cost of the operation, which is measured by the average of the spreads on the different 
platforms plus the fixed cost of trading given by C. This is a clear effect as spreads are 
trading costs to be paid by the trader. So the higher the overall cost, the lower the 
chances of a profitable arbitrage opportunity. 
The last result given by (12) is intuitive as it gives the conditions for the arbitrage 
profit to be positive. It is clear from the last formula that the model has stochastic 
behaviour with two components ( tu  and tν ) as the source of randomness. This 
                                                 
22
 See appendix 1 for the details. 
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implies that the condition given in (12) is also driven by a random component.  That 
being said, the interest now is to calculate the probability of a negative spread as a 
function of the parameters from the structural model.  
We begin with the expansion of the inventory term in (12). It can be proved
23
 that the 
term  
1, 1tI −  will follow:  
 
1
1, 1
1
t
t t j
j
I λ ν
−
− −
=
= − ∑         (13) 
 
Therefore the inventory at time t-1 is just the negative of the cumulative sum of 
trades. Substituting back in (11), we can decompose the arbitrage profit equation as 
follows: 
 
2,1
tarbPL X Y Z= + +         (14) 
 
Where: 
 
1 1
0 0
k k
t j t j
j j
X u θ ν
− −
− −
= =
= +∑ ∑        (15) 
( )( )
1
1 2
1
1
t
t j
j
Y b bλ λ ν
−
−
=
= − − ∑        (16) 
1 2
2
c c
Z C
+
= − −         (17) 
 
Equation (14) is intuitive as it explicitly breaks the arbitrage profit into different 
factors. Factor X is the lagged update at order k on one of the platforms. Factor Y is 
the inventory imbalance between the market makers and factor Z represents the 
trading costs associated with the arbitrage strategy (quoted spread and trading fees). 
Another interesting result from last equation is that the expected profit from the 
arbitrage operation is negative. This result is based on the properties of the 
disturbances and the spread. That is, ( ) 0tE u = , ( ) 0tE ν = , , 0jc C >  and ( )j jE c c=  
for j=1,2. The expected loss is then given by ( )2,1 1 2
2
t
c c
E arbPL C
+
= − − . Therefore, 
in expectation, the operation of buying and selling in different platforms will yield a 
loss, which is an intuitive result.  
By checking the condition of a positive profit of the arbitrage trades ( 2,1 0tarbPL > ), 
we have the result that this event would be true for: 
 
                                                 
23
 See Appendix 2 for derivation. 
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X Y Z+ > −          (18) 
 
Note that given the parameters of the structural model, the term Z  is a constant and 
X Y+  is a stochastic process. Our interest is in calculating the closed formula for the 
probability that Equation (18) holds true. Given a particular distribution for X Y+ , 
this probability is given by: 
 
( ) ( )2,1Pr 0 1 |tarbPL cdf X Y Z> = − + ≤ − Ω      (19) 
 
For the last equation, the term ( )|cdf X Y Z+ ≤ − Ω  is the cumulative density 
function of X Y+  evaluated at –Z, conditional on a set of parameters defined in 
vector Ω . So far we do not have the distribution function for the measure in question. 
In order to derive that we need to explicitly set the distributions of the disturbances. 
For the sake of simplicity we are going to use the normal distributions
24
 for tu  and tν
. That is, tu  and tν  are uncorrelated at any (cross) lag and they follow an i.i.d. normal 
distribution with constant variances 2
uσ  and 
2
νσ , respectively. 
A useful property for our case is that the sum of dependent normal random variables 
will also follow a normal with mean equal to the sum of the means and the variance 
equal to the sum of the variances plus a term for the covariance of the variables
25
. 
This property implies
26
 that: 
 
 
( )( )2 2 2~ 0, uX N k νσ θ σ+         (20)  
( )( ) ( )( )2 21 2~ 0, 1 1Y N b b t νλ λ σ− − −      (21) 
 
And:  
 
 
( )2~ 0, X YX Y N σ ++         (22) 
2 2 2
,2X Y X Y X Yσ σ σ σ+ = + +        (23) 
( )2 2 2 2X uk νσ σ θ σ= +         (24) 
( )( ) ( )22 21 21 1Y b b t νσ λ λ σ= − − −       (25) 
( )( )( ) 2, 1 21 1X Y b b k νσ θ λ λ σ= − − −       (26)
 
                                                 
24
 The assumption of normality is not particularly necessary for the main conclusions of the derivations. 
The tractability of the Gaussian density greatly simplifies the analysis but we are confident that the 
main intuition from the results will also hold for more unconventional distributions. 
25
 Formally, the property is that if X and Y follow normal, then X+Y will also be normal with variance 
given by 2 2 2
,2X Y X Y X Yσ σ σ σ+ = + + . 
26
 Derivation for the covariance of X and Y can be found in Appendix 3. 
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With this last result given by (20)-(26) we have the distribution for X+Y, for which we 
can easily calculate the cumulative probability function given values of 1b , 2b ,λ , t, θ , 
k , 2νσ  and 
2
uσ . Therefore, following previous arguments, we can show that the 
probability of a profit by buying on platform two and instantaneously selling on 
platform one is given by: 
 
( )2,1
2
1
Pr 0 1 1
2 2
t
X Y
Z
arbPL erf
σ +
  −  > = − +
    
     (27) 
 
For Equation (27), ( )2,1Pr 0tarbPL >  is the probability of a cross market arbitrage 
profit. The term (.)erf  is the error function. It is easy to see that this formula is 
simply one minus the cumulative distribution function evaluated at -Z of a normal 
variable with zero expectation and variance given by Equation (23).  
But, note that so far we had an arbitrary signal of trades on the platforms (buy order 
for platform two and sell order for platform one). This is counter intuitive as given the 
existence of an arbitrage profit, a trader is indifferent as to on which platform to buy 
and which to sell. That is, the measure which we are interested in is the joint 
probability of an arbitrage profit, irrespective of the trading platform which we make 
the buy and sell operations. By inverting the signs in (10), we can show that the profit 
by buying in platform one and selling in platform two is: 
 
1,2
tarbPL X Y Z= − − +        (28) 
 
 
Where the terms X, Y and Z are given by Equations (15) to (17). Using the last 
formula, we can see that the probability of a profit in this setup is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1,2Pr 0 Pr | Pr |tarbPL X Y Z X Y Z> = + < Ω ≅ + ≤ Ω    (29) 
 
Note that for the last formula we assume that the probability of X+Y being exactly 
equal to Z is negligible. This simplifies the formula as now the term 
( )Pr |X Y Z+ ≤ Ω  is the cumulative distribution function of a normal variable 
evaluated at a given point. Aggregating the result of (19) and (22) we have that the 
probability of an arbitrage profit (and consequently a negative spread), irrespective of 
the trading platform, is given by: 
 
( ) ( )
[ ] [ ]( )
( ) ( )
2,1 1,2Pr 0 Pr 0 0  
                         Pr
                         1 Pr | Pr |
t t tarbPL arbPL arbPL
X Y Z X Y Z
X Y Z X Y Z
   > = > >   
= + > − + ≤
= − + ≤ − Ω + + ≤ Ω
∪
∪   (30) 
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For the last formula we used the property that both events are mutually exclusive - 
that is, if 2,1
tarbPL  is higher than zero, then this implies that 2,tp  is higher than 1,tp  , 
therefore 2,1
tarbPL  has to be lower than zero (see Equation (10)).  
By combining the results from Equation (30) with the results from Equation (27) we 
have the final formula for the probability of a cross market arbitrage opportunity: 
 
( ) ( )2
0
2
Pr 0 1 exptarbPL t dt
ψ
π
> = + −∫      (31) 
 
Where: 
 
( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )
1
1 2
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
2
2 1 1 1 2 1u
c c C
k b b b b t kν ν
ψ
σ θ σ λ λ σ λ λ θ
−− + +
=
 + + − − − − − + −   
(32) 
 
For Equation (31), note that the values of ( )Pr 0 tarbPL >  are bounded by zero and 
one. The probability of an arbitrage opportunity will increase as 2
uσ  , 
2
νσ  , k  and θ  
increases and will decrease as the fixed costs to trade (parameters 1c , 2c  and C ) 
increase. For the coefficients 1b , 2b  and λ , the analysis is not direct as they are 
interacting in the calculation of the variance of X+Y, which is one of the drivers of 
Equation (32). But, by holding λ  constant we can say that the higher the difference 
between 1b  and 2b , the higher the chances of a cross market arbitrage opportunity. 
This is an intuitive result as the higher is the difference of the inventory reaction level 
for the dealers in the different platforms, the higher should be the chances that a 
change in the mid quote portrays an arbitrage profit. Another intuitive result from (30) 
is that if 1 2b b=  and 0.5λ =  that is, if both platforms evenly share the order flow and 
both market makers react equally to their inventory, then it is true that 0Yσ =  and 
, 0X Yσ = , implying that in this case, only a possible price delay (value of k) can create 
a chance for an arbitrage opportunity. 
Also, for the special case of 0k =  (no delay of quote update in one of the platforms), 
we see that 
2 0Xσ =  and , 0X Yσ = , which simplifies formula (23) to 
( )( ) ( )22 2, 1 21 1X Y b b t νσ λ λ σ= − − − . This result implies that parameter θ , which is 
measuring covariance between order flow and the efficient price (the asymmetric 
information effect), only comes into play for the likelihood of an arbitrage 
opportunity if there is a lag in the quote update process (parameter k). If there is no 
delay for the quote update (k=0), then the proportion of informed traders in the market 
is irrelevant to an arbitrage event.  
Given fixed values for 1 2 0.25c c C= = = , 1φ = , 
2 20.05uσ = , 
2 20.5νσ = , 0.05θ = ,  
1 0.1b = , 2 0.2b = ,  0.75λ =  and varying values of t and k, we have the following 
figure for the shape of Equation (31).  
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Figure 1 – The Probability of Arbitrage Opportunities 
 
Figure 1 shows the probabilities of a profitable arbitrage position as functions of the 
lagged value of the efficient price update in the quote equation for one of the 
platforms and also the number of observed trades (value of t). The higher the number 
of trades observed, the higher the probability of the existence of a positive profit in a 
multi-platform arbitrage. This relation also holds true for the value of k, where the 
higher the lag update in the quote equation on one of the platforms, the higher the 
probability of an arbitrage profit. Note that we can also follow similar arguments for 
the volatilities of the random components. In general, the higher are the values of 2νσ  
and 2
uσ , the higher is the likelihood of an arbitrage opportunity. 
We can further support the derivations of Equation (32) with the use of Monte Carlo 
simulations. The multivariate process given by formulas (2) to (9) can be simulated 
given values of the parameter and we can check for each time t whether an arbitrage 
opportunity is available or not
27
. This is basically a computational approach to the 
derivation of the probabilities of negative spreads. We performed this investigation 
with the following parameters: 0.15θ = , 0.05uσ = , 0.5νσ = , 1 0.25b = , 2 0.2b = , 
0.75λ = , 1k =  and 0.25C = . By comparing the probabilities from the simulations 
and the probabilities from the analytical solution we have the following picture: 
 
 
                                                 
27
 This is given by checking whether the buy price is lower than the sell price. Formally the condition is 
given by 
1 2 1 2
1, 2, 1, 2,
min , max ,
2 2 2 2
t t t t
c c c c
p p p p
   + + > − −   
   
.  
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Figure 2 – Simulation and Analytical Solutions for Arbitrage Opportunities 
 
 
The values for Figure 2 were calculated by simulating the microstructure model for 
1000 times. As one can see, the values from the analytical solution match the 
probabilities from the simulated equations very well. This result corroborates our 
mathematical derivations. 
 
Methodology 
The objective of this paper is to identify the drivers of an arbitrage profit at a 
microstructure level. The theoretical derivations showed that the likelihood of a 
negative spread is related to three factors: the average spread across platforms and the 
explicit transaction cost, the inventory imbalance in terms of past inventory and 
dealer’s reaction and also the existence of a lag update for the efficient price in one of 
the platforms. The first two are relatively easier to test than the last one, the reasoning 
being that the quoted spread is observed at any point in time and, even though the 
inventory of each dealer is not visible, we know from Equations (3) and (7) that its 
driver is the incoming of trades
28
 (the higher the number of observed trades, the 
higher the change in inventory). The difficulty in empirically studying the lag update 
factor is because the efficient price process is not observed and therefore it is not 
                                                 
28
 But, be aware that if there are informed traders in the market, order flow can also impact the quotes 
at a contemporaneous level. Therefore, the effect of trades in arbitrage opportunities has two 
dimensions, the inventory effect and the asymmetric information effect. The difference of the impact of 
these effects towards the likelihood of an arbitrage profit is that the last one is only true if k is higher 
than zero. 
16 
 
possible to test whether the quotes are following a particular lagged regression 
specification.  
For the other factors, the research is a straightforward causal relationship 
investigation. For the paper we use two methods. The first is an event study 
framework and the second is the formal estimation of a probit specification. In the 
event study part we are interested in seeing what is the profile for the behavior of the 
variables in question (e.g. number of trades, average value of spreads) just prior to the 
event of a negative spread. Since the time of a negative spread is always observable, 
we can compute aggregate measures of the number of trades, the value of the spread, 
volatility and so forth for the time before and after the event. These values are then 
analyzed through a graphical representation. This simple framework of the study can 
give important information regarding the profile of an arbitrage profit and whether the 
implications from the theoretical model make sense in real world data. 
While the event study is straightforward to implement, it does not provide a formal 
testing background for our hypothesis regarding the likelihood of an arbitrage profit. 
For this objective, we choose to use a formal probit specification for each of the 
bonds. The dependent variable will be the occurrence of a negative spread, which 
takes value one if an arbitrage opportunity takes place at time t and zero otherwise. 
The econometric specification will follow: 
 
( )
. . . .
t t
t t t t t
DnegSpread X
X Spread nTrades Volat timeDayα β φ γ θ− − −
= Φ
= + + + +
   (33) 
 
Where: 
 - Dummy vector with ocurrences of a negative spread
 - Adjusted average value of spread for time 
 - Adjusted number of trades for time 
 - Volatility at time 
t
t
t
t
DnegSpread
Spread t
nTrades t
Volat t
timeD
−
−
−
 - Time of the day (in hours)tay
 
 
For Equation (33), the function Φ  is the cumulative normal density which ensures 
that the fitted values ( ( )tXΦ ) are bounded in [0, 1]. All the models were estimated 
by maximum likelihood
29
. The choice of explanatory variables follows the hypothesis 
which we are testing in the paper, more precisely, that the behavior of spreads and 
inventory in each platform helps to predict the occurrence of an arbitrage profit. The 
spread variable is calculated by aggregating the best quotes in both platforms. That is, 
we find the best ask and bid prices for every point in time and then we compute the 
difference between, which is our measure of spread. 
Note thought that the inventory level for each market maker is not observed. But, it is 
clear that such a measure is driven by the number of executed trades. So, the higher 
                                                 
29
 Special thanks to James Le Sague for providing a resourceful econometric toolbox for Matlab 
(http://www.spatial-econometrics.com/). 
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the number of observed trades, the higher the variation in the inventory of a particular 
dealer. Therefore we use the number of trades as our proxy for inventory behavior. 
But, it should also be pointed out that the order flow will impact the quotes on a 
different level if there is a delay in price update and informed traders are present in 
the market. Therefore, following our theoretical model we can argue in two ways 
regarding the role of the number of trades
30
. The variable ttimeDay  measures 
(seconds) the time from midnight for each of the 10 minute intervals. The idea is to 
test whether there is an intraday pattern for the likelihood of an arbitrage opportunity. 
The motivation behind this test is given in the event study part of the paper. 
It also should be pointed out that in order to be able to estimate the model given by 
(33), we aggregate the tick by tick data by taking averages in ten minute intervals. We 
also adjust such an aggregation in order to avoid any bias in the estimation. For 
instance, if we aggregate the explanatory variables to ten minute intervals 
unconditionally, then it may happen that in the estimation we are using information 
after the occurrence of a negative spread. This would be counterintuitive as what we 
are studying are the drivers of an arbitrage profit which, by definition, would consist 
of information prior to the event. The solution we find for this problem is to aggregate 
the data conditionally. For the times where a negative spread event was present, we 
find the time it occurred within the ten minute interval and for the averages we use 
only events prior to it
31
. This way, for any of the variables, the probit model will not 
be using future information for the estimation of the parameters.  
 
The Data 
The data for this study are kindly supplied by MTS
32
 in conjunction with the ICMA 
Centre. The main data consist of trades and quotes for fixed income instruments in 
European countries. While this vast database contains tick by tick data starting from 
April 2003 to the present, we select the year 2004. We further restrict the data to 
cover bonds only from Italy. This is the country with highest liquidity in trading 
terms
33
. For example, Italy alone represents approximately 65% of all trades for the 
year 2004. We further restrict the data to only bonds that are traded on the European 
and the local platforms
34
 with issue date prior to the first day in the sample. Given this 
population of instruments, we group them according to their maturity with respect to 
the first day of the research (02/01/2004) taking into account a band of half a year. 
This means that a bond maturing on 01/04/2005 would have 1.24 years since 
02/01/2004 and would be labeled as a one year bond. When more than one bond is 
found for each maturity label, we search for the one with the highest number of 
trades. We also remove any bond which has no occurrence of negative spreads. At the 
end of this selection procedure we are left with twelve Italian fixed income 
instruments.   
                                                 
30
 We also ran the probit models using the absolute of order flow imbalance in between platforms as 
one of the explanatory variables. The results are very comparable to the use of the number of trades. 
31
 For the cases where there were no events prior to the negative spread occurrence, we use the values 
of the variables in the previous 10 minute interval. 
32
 See http://www.mtsgroup.org/. 
33
 See (MTS, 2007). 
34
 Further details about the structure of the local platforms in MTS markets can be found in (Cheung, 
Jong, & Rindi, 2005) and (MTS, 2007). 
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After finding the bonds of the research, we need first to filter the high frequency data 
before using it in the research. The only filter we used for this research was to delete 
any quote change which does not imply a change in the quoted price or size for the 
first level of the order book. The original MTS dataset was built by saving every 
change in the first three levels of the order book. For this study, we are not 
particularly interested in the second or third best prices. The second adjustment of the 
dataset is the filtering of large quote prices changes. The market makers in MTS are 
not obliged to provide quotes in all trading hours of the day. It may happen that for 
some time window there are no primary dealers providing competitive quotes for a 
particular bond. If this event is true and a large trade comes through, it will consume 
the order book in the same direction of the trade. This joint event, if it happens, results 
in high price movements in the bid ask quotes (very low (high) for bid (ask)). Since 
the quoted spread is one of the variables of the research, we are particularly interested 
in removing such noise. The approach here is to find any price movement that is 
higher than an arbitrary 5% percent threshold. When these cases are found, the 
“inadequate” prices are substituted by the previous prices
35
. This procedure produces 
a smooth behavior for the quoted prices (bid and ask) and consequently a smooth 
behavior for the quoted spread
36
. 
On a side note, it is important to establish that there are some crucial differences 
between the structure of the theoretical model given in the theory and the structure of 
the MTS markets. For the theory we had two platforms where there was a unique 
market maker in each. For the European bond market there are multiple dealers for 
each instrument in each platform, which are not identifiable on a tick by tick basis. 
Also, some of these dealers in MTS can post parallel quotes in both platforms, that is, 
they can simultaneously update their prices in both trading venues. But, even with this 
difference, we can still argue that the conclusions from the theoretical part should 
hold for the MTS market since there are still inventory needs for each market maker. 
The fact that there are multiple dealers should scale down the inventory effect, but it 
will still be present. Next in Table 1, we present some statistical information 
regarding this dataset. 
                                                 
35
 The consequence of this procedure is the assumption that if there was a market maker, he/she would 
not price the impact of these large trades in the quotes. While this is unrealistic, it is more intuitive (and 
simpler) than assigning an arbitrary impact to the prices. 
36
 It should be pointed out that we also test the robustness of our results by running the study without 
any filtering of large price moves. The final results are almost identical. 
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For Table 1, the bond Code column is the ISIN
37
 nomenclature for the different assets. 
The second column shows the type of bonds where, in this case, the great majority are 
of the BTP type
38
 which are bullet bonds
39
 with different maturities paying a fixed 
coupon rate annually or semi-annually. For the maturities of the bonds in Table 1, we 
can see that they are sorted by the relative maturity from the first date of the sample 
(01/01/2004). We have in total twelve bonds, each in a specific maturity band. Note 
that the maturity of the bonds has effects on the volatility of the price changes 
(measured by mid quote change). For Table 1 it is clear that bonds with higher 
maturity also show higher variability in the price changes. This can be explained by 
the fact that higher maturities are more sensitive to interest rate dynamics than shorter 
maturities
40
. So, when news about interest rates comes to the market, the prices of 
bonds with higher maturities will present a stronger reaction to it, resulting in higher 
variability of price changes when compared to short term bonds. 
In terms of the size of the dataset, which is being measured by the number of quote 
changes and trades in Table 1, we see that the volume of information is relatively 
high. Note that these values are computed after the filtering of the data
41
. This is an 
expected feature of tick by tick data. As a rule, we see a bigger number of quote 
changes with respect to the number of observed trades. On average there are 
approximately 52 quote changes for each trade.  
Interestingly, the simple statistics presented in Table 1 already show some 
microstructure effects. For instance, when one looks at the average values of the 
quoted spreads, it is clear that they are increasing with the maturity of each country. 
This is intuitive since bonds with a higher maturity have higher sensitivity to interest 
rates. Therefore it is riskier for the market maker to provide liquidity for this 
particular instrument as the changes in the price can go against the volume of his 
inventory. Therefore, this dealer will demand a higher return for the increase in risk, 
which is translated in higher spreads. We also explain such higher spreads for longer 
maturities with the information asymmetry effect. A trader with privileged 
information about the interest rate will maximize his earnings by trading in the longer 
maturities. The market maker is aware of such an effect and will also demand higher 
compensation given this higher likelihood of informed traders trading in these 
particular instruments. 
 
Results 
We start the discussion of the results with the presentation of a simple description of 
the negative spreads events, in Table 2. 
                                                 
37
 The ISIN code is a unique international label for each bond. Those are assigned by each country’s 
numbering agency. 
38
 BTP translates to “Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali”. 
39
 These are bonds that cannot be redeemed prior to maturity. 
40
 This is based on the pricing function of a bond. The higher the maturity of the bond, higher the 
sensitivity of the pricing function with respect to the discount rate. See (Martellini, Priaulet, & Priaulet, 
Fixed-Income Securities, Risk Management and Portfolio Strategies, 2003) for details. 
41
 On average, the filtering removed 66% of the original dataset. 
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The values in Table 2 describe the events of arbitrage opportunities found in the data. 
It is important to note that we only count non consecutive negative spreads. So, if 
there was a negative spread at t and t+1, we only save the event for t. The intuition is 
that the consecutive negative spreads are just a continuation of the first occurrence, 
and therefore they do not constitute a new event.  
For the second column of Table 2, we have the number of negative spreads found for 
each bond on the period of 2004. When comparing the relative size of these events 
with respect to the number of quote changes, it is clear that they represent a very 
small proportion. On average, there are approximately 246 cases of negative spreads 
for each bond. This implies an average rate of approximately 1787 quote changes for 
each occurrence of a negative spread. Therefore, inter platform arbitrage opportunities 
are not common in the market. The third column shows the percentage of times which 
the European platform originated the arbitrage event. Looking at these values we can 
see that on average the arbitrage events are more likely to be initiated in the local 
platforms. This can be explained by the fact that there is a higher volume of trades in 
the local platform as opposed to the European one. 
The fifth column of Table 2 shows how much time an arbitrage profit lasts in the 
market. Again this calculation does not recognize a consecutive spread as a new 
event. The calculated values take into account the whole time for which an arbitrage 
profit was quoted in the market. A typical negative spread lasts for approximately 77 
seconds for all of the bonds. But, one of the bonds is pushing this average up. When 
ignoring the outlier
42
 (IT0003625909) we have an average duration of approximately 
1.28 seconds. Remember that the MTS market is a multi dealer platform so that there 
are multiple dealers quoting each instrument. Therefore the duration of negative 
spreads in Table 2 shows an aggregate measure across dealers. For the majority of the 
bonds this duration is very small (e.g. fifteen percent of a second for IT0003248512), 
which implies that a great majority of the dealers in MTS indeed have a software 
control
43
 against the creation of arbitrage opportunities.  
The sixth column of Table 2 provides the number of seconds which it takes for the 
market maker to change the quotes after the negative spread. Understandably, it 
would be intuitive to expect that such a change happens right after the event. But, 
when looking at values in Table 2, we see that for some of the bonds the arbitrage 
opportunities last longer than the time it takes for the next quote change after the 
negative spread. This implies that some of the dealers still make quote changes even 
after the occurrence of the arbitrage profit. Note also that the duration of a negative 
spread (fifth column in Table 2) is much less than the average amount of time it takes 
for a trade to come in after the negative spread event (seventh column in Table 2, 
average equal to approximately 37 minutes). This implies that, on average, these 
arbitrage opportunities are not actually traded. This is also supported when one looks 
at the eighth column of Table 2, which shows the proportion of cases where the 
negative spread event was followed by a consecutive buy and sell trade at the 
underpriced and overpriced platforms, respectively. 
                                                 
42
 The bond in question is clearly an outlier. Other statistics also show the same pattern. 
43
 Algorithm quoting is the use of computers for controlling dealers’ quotes in the market. For this 
particular case it represents a control from the software side which makes sure that no inter platform 
arbitrage opportunity is created. But note that the software control is ex post reactive, meaning that it 
only becomes active after the arbitrage event occurred. The argument is that if it was ex ante reactive 
no arbitrage opportunity would be found in the data. 
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The last three columns of Table 2 show simple trading statistics regarding these 
arbitrage opportunities. In order to construct these figures, we follow a simple strategy 
which is to trade a volume equal to the minimum being offered in the arbitrage bid 
and ask volumes. The idea is the existence of an arbitrageur with no capital 
constraints who takes the maximum possible size position in order to profit from the 
mispricing. Since there are two legs in the arbitrage strategy, the maximum possible 
traded volume will be given by the minimum volume at the quotes involved in the 
arbitrage. We further assume no transaction costs and no execution risks in the trades. 
From the average size of these positions, one can see that they deal with a significant 
amount of resources. On average across the bonds, each purchase leg of the arbitrage 
trade will involve more than half a billion Euros. But, these can be scaled down by 
decreasing the volume traded, which was assumed to be the maximum possible. When 
comparing the profit from the trades with respect to the size of the position, we see 
that the average return per trade is small (average of three basis points per trade). This 
result was expected as the price divergence between the platforms is usually very 
small. 
The next part of our analysis is related to the event study framework. In this part we 
show what happens to the variables in question when a negative spread occurs. For 
this event study we set a window of one hour around the occurrence of a negative 
spread. First we find all the cases of negative spreads and save the data within this 
particular window before and after the event. We further aggregate all the variables 
using averages in one minute bands. While we have a picture for each of the bonds in 
the research, we are far more interested in reporting an overall picture for the whole 
data. The problem in this case is that all of the data are asset dependent. Different 
volatilities and microstructure effects will make the scale of each variable unique to a 
particular instrument, meaning that they cannot be simply aggregated cross bonds by 
taking an average. For the paper we choose to use a simple normalization prior to 
cross bond aggregation. This normalization will follow: 
 
( )
t t
t
y
y E y
Y
σ
−
=         (34) 
 
For Equation (34), the term 
i
y  is the variable in question (e.g. volatility, number of 
trades etc). The calculation of the averages ( ( )
t
E y ) and standard deviations ( yσ ) 
will take into account the whole period. So, this normalized variable related to the 
information of how much the values are situated from the expectation. This formula is 
then applied for each of the bonds and then averages are taken cross bonds in the 
calculation of the aggregate measures. Starting the presentation of empirical results, 
next, Figures 2 to 5 we report the main results of the event study.  
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Figure 3 – Event Study for Normalized Spreads 
 
Figure 4 – Event Study for Normalized Volatility 
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Figure 5 – Event Study for Normalized Number of Quote Changes 
 
Figure 6 – Event Study for Normalized Number of Trades 
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The illustrations in Figure 3 to Figure 6 show the average behavior of each of the 
aggregated measures. The x axis represents the sixty minutes before and after the 
occurrence of a negative spread. The y axis measures how the averages of normalized 
values behave for the whole set of bonds in each platform. These are normalized 
distances from the sample’s average so that the values in the previous figures show 
how different the values of the variables in question are from their respective 
expectations.  
The first picture, Figure 3, shows the behavior of the normalized spread. Prior to the 
occurrence of an arbitrage profit, the values of the spread are, in general, lower than 
the average in both platforms. Half a hour before the arbitrage event, the spreads are 
on average equal to the mean but descend very fast up to time zero, which is when the 
negative spread occurs. After that, the spreads quickly change to normal levels. Note 
that this is true for the local and European platforms. 
For the second picture, Figure 4, we have the values for normalized volatility. For this 
case it seems that prior to the event of a negative spread, the values for normalized 
variability are relatively unstable, oscillating between high and low values. In general, 
these values are mostly higher than zero, implying that prior to a negative spread 
event there is a relatively high variation in mid quote changes. After time zero, the 
normalized volatility shoots up but this is simply the effect of the quote change after 
the arbitrage profit. From this picture of normalized volatility, we can say that the 
absolute changes in quotes after the arbitrage event are, normally, higher than their 
expectation. That is, the quote change which nulls the arbitrage opportunity is 
relatively strong when compared to its unconditional distribution. This can be 
explained by the software control from the market maker side. 
The third picture, Figure 5, shows the aggregate number of quote changes prior to 
(and after) the negative spread event. It seems that one hour before period zero, the 
number of quote changes is relatively lower than the average. Then they follow a 
clear trend towards normal levels. After the arbitrage event, the number of quote 
changes goes up radically. Clearly this is the quick reactive response to the arbitrage 
opportunity, which also corroborates the evidence for algorithm quoting
44
 given in 
Table 2. 
The last picture, Figure 6, shows the average normalized number of trades. While for 
times away from the zero mark it seems that the number of trades in both platforms is 
relatively normal, for the times near to the arbitrage events, the number of trades 
reaches 4 standard deviations from the mean in the local platform and 1.5 for the 
European. Clearly these are abnormal values when compared to the whole sample’s 
distribution. This implies that just prior to an arbitrage event there is an abnormal 
number of trades on both platforms. This measure is also abnormal after the event and 
this can be explained by the fact that the improvement of quotes from the market 
maker side, which was one of the drivers of the arbitrage opportunity, has attracted 
trades. Therefore we would expect a high trading activity before and after the negative 
spread event, which is exactly the picture portrayed by Figure 6. 
This result corroborates the theoretical implication in the previous section of the 
paper. Remember that in the theoretical model, one of the factors behind the 
likelihood of an arbitrage profit is the inventory imbalances in between the platforms. 
If the two market makers have opposite excess inventories, they will improve quotes 
                                                 
44
 This could be either the computer driven cancelation or a change of the quotes. 
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in opposite direction in order to induce trades. When such an event happens, it might 
be possible that the improved quotes portray an arbitrage opportunity. Now, 
remember that the dealer’s inventory is not observed but we know that its driver is the 
number of trades. The higher the number of trades, the higher the inventory change in 
any direction. The picture for the normalized number of trades in Figure 2 clearly 
corroborates such an argument. But be aware that following the microstructure model 
we can also explain the impact of the order flow as the effect of informed trading and 
price delay. We cannot differentiate these effects within the analysis of Figure 6. 
One of the conclusions to draw from the results of the event study (Figure 3 to Figure 
6) is that market makers respond strongly and quickly to the occurrence of an 
arbitrage profit. This is portrayed by Figure 3 to Figure 5 where right after the 
occurrence of a negative spread we observe an abnormal number of quote changes, a 
high value for normalized volatility and also an abrupt change in the value of the 
normalized spreads. When comparing the results for the event study with respect to 
the theoretical derivations in first part of the paper, we see that they do corroborate  
the case of the effect of trades (inventory imbalance and price delay) and the level of 
spreads. In general, the occurrence of an arbitrage opportunity will be preceded by an 
unusually small value of the spread and an abnormally high number of trades.  
An interesting piece of information from this study is the pattern for the intraday time 
of occurrence of a negative spread. Next, in Figure 7, we present the frequency of 
arbitrage opportunities with respect to the time of the day. 
 
Figure 7 – Histogram for Intraday Time of Occurrence of Arbitrage Profits 
 
The values in Figure 7 show an almost linear relationship between the occurrence of 
the negative spread and the time of the day. This was calculated based on the negative 
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spreads occurrence for all of the bonds. The closer we are to the end of the day, the 
higher the chances of a negative spread. A possible explanation for the previous 
picture is that when dealers reach the end of the day, they have sufficient reasons for 
breaking even, that is, to finish the day with a zero (or insignificant) amount of 
inventory
45
. The reasoning being that overnight news is a risk factor for the market 
maker. A market maker who does not care about end of day inventory will demand 
higher compensation for this particular risk by increasing spreads during trading 
hours. But, remember that for the MTS market there are multiple dealers. A dealer 
who manages his inventory and can end the day flat is not exposed to overnight 
inventory risk will be able to offer more competitive quotes
46
.  
Following this logic within a competitive market dynamics, it is clear that each 
market maker has an incentive to end the day with flat (or insignificant) inventory 
level. Now, remember that one of the parameters that drive the likelihood of the 
arbitrage profit event was the reaction of the dealers towards its past inventory (see 
parameter b  in Equation (2)). As we reach the end of the day, following the logic 
given before, the dealers have more incentive to improve quotes with respect to their 
inventory level, that is, they increase the value of b . As long as this increase is not 
also observed on the other platform (see Equation (16)), this effect will increase the 
likelihood of an arbitrage profit. 
An alternative explanation would be that the shape of Figure 7 is simply the shape of 
the intraday pattern for the number of trades. Remember that the higher the number of 
trades, the higher the inventory change and therefore the higher the chances of an 
arbitrage profit. If the number of trades increases within the day, then it would be 
expected that the number of arbitrage opportunities also increases. But, for our data, 
this is clearly not the case.  
  
                                                 
45
 Empirical evidence of this inventory management strategy can be found in Hasbrouck (2007). 
46
 This relation will be dependent on the requirements for disposing of inventory. In our argument, we 
assume that the cost of disposing of inventory is lower than the required compensation for the 
overnight inventory risk. 
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Figure 8 – Intraday Pattern for Number of Trades 
 
 
As we can see from Figure 8, the trading activity follows an inverted “W” pattern 
over the trading hours with a high number of trades at around 10:00 and 15:00. 
Therefore, this alternative explanation does not hold for our case. Close to the middle 
of the day (13:00) there is a decrease in the trading activity and this could explain the 
same gap for the pattern in Figure 7, where the decrease in number of trades also 
decrease the likelihood of a arbitrage opportunity. But, for the rest of the times of the 
day, it is clear that the shape of Figure 7 cannot be explained by the shape of Figure 8. 
Therefore, we maintain our argument that the pattern of frequency of arbitrage 
opportunities towards the time of the day is the result of inventory management from 
the dealer’s side, which cannot be explained by the information asymmetry effect.  
Next, we show the results from the estimation of the formal probit specification. 
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The values in Table 3 show how the different factors impact on the likelihood of an 
arbitrage profit. Remember that in the estimation we only use past information for the 
models
47
. In the aggregation procedure, we adjusted the variables so that they do not 
use data after the arbitrage profit event. For the adjusted spread coefficient, we see 
that its parameter ( β ) is negative for all cases and statistically significant for 
approximately 92% of the bonds (11 out of 12), meaning that the lower the value of 
the spread, the higher the likelihood of an arbitrage profit.  
For the value of φ , which is the coefficient for the adjusted number of trades, we see 
that its value is always positive and statistically significant. We had similar results 
from the aggregate picture in the event study (Figure 3 to Figure 6) and from the 
information of Table 3, it seems that the relationship also holds strongly for the bonds 
on an individual basis. Therefore, the higher the number of observed trades in the 
past, the higher the probability of occurrence of an arbitrage profit. 
For the parameter γ , which measures the relationship between the likelihood of  a 
negative spread and the pre-event volatility of the log returns, we see that its value is 
mostly positive, indicating that the higher the volatility of the mid quote price, the 
higher the probability of the occurrence of an arbitrage profit. This positive property 
is also found for the θ  parameter, which measures the dependency of the negative 
spread arbitrage with respect to the time of the day. But, it is clear that the effect is 
weaker as for only approximately 75% of the cases (9 out of 12) is the theta parameter 
positive and statistically significant. 
When looking at the fitting performance of the models, which is being measured by 
the McFadden pseudo R squared and the percentage of correct predictions
48
, we see 
that the performance of the models is relatively acceptable when considering that we 
are dealing with high frequency data. With the exception of one bond 
(IT0003625909), the values of McFadden R squared values range from 0.16 to .29. 
When analyzing the value of correct and incorrect percentage predictions, we observe 
that the model performed relatively well, with the number of correct predictions 
significantly larger than the number of incorrect signals. Again, we find an outlier 
value for the previously mentioned bond, which correctly predicted 94.52% of the 
negative spreads occurrences. 
In general the results from Table 3 are as expected. The signs of the parameters are all 
consistent with the theoretical predictions given in the first part of the paper. That is, 
the optimal scenario for the occurrence of an inter dealer arbitrage profit is given by 
low spreads across platforms, the incoming of a high number of trades, an increase in 
the volatility and also a time period close to the end of the day. Therefore, 
empirically, we can argue that the effect seen in the abstract microstructure model 
applies to the European bond market. 
  
                                                 
47
 This is the reasoning behind the use of the minus symbol on the parameter’s names. 
48
 The number of correct predictions is simply the number of times which the model correctly 
forecasted an arbitrage opportunity. We use a threshold of 50% in such calculation. Similar 
calculations are conducted for the value in the column “Incorrect signals percentage” but, in this case, 
the interest is the number of incorrect signals generated by the model. 
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Conclusions 
The objective of this paper was to investigate the drivers behind the occurrence of a 
cross market arbitrage opportunity. Within a theoretical framework supported by a 
structural model, we were able to show that theoretically the likelihood of a multi 
platform arbitrage profit at any point in time is a function of the average level of the 
spreads, the inventory reaction imbalance in between the market makers of the 
different trading platforms and also the relative delay of the efficient price update in 
the mid quote price process. 
We investigated the existence of these negative spreads for a vast dataset consisting of 
twelve bonds from the most liquid European bond market, Italy. Simple statistics 
show that these inter platform arbitrage opportunities are relatively rare, they usually 
last for less than one and a half seconds and are not traded upon. The event study 
which we applied showed that prior to the occurrence of an arbitrage opportunity, the 
spreads are in a relatively low level and there are a relatively large number of 
observed trades in both platforms. Also, after the event the market makers react 
quickly, which increases the number of quote changes significantly. This quick 
reaction, which in some cases takes an average of only 15% of a second suggests that 
the reaction from the market maker is software related (algorithm quoting) for most of 
the cases. The results from the event study were corroborated in the formal probit 
econometric model. The direction of the effects were all respecting the predictions 
from the theoretical microstructure model.  
The contribution of this paper resides in describing the drivers of arbitrage 
opportunities at a microstructure level. We show empirically that the predictions from 
the microstructure model are supported in the observed high frequency dataset. This 
sheds theoretical and empirical evidence that that arbitrage opportunities are the result 
of microstructure frictions in the trading process. While we constrained our analysis 
to inter platform arbitrage opportunities, the setup given in the theoretical part of the 
paper can easily be extended to other types of arbitrage with minor modifications. 
These and other considerations with respect to the microstructure model underlying 
the derivations are left for future research. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1 - Expansion of the Arbitrage Profit Equation 
The profit from instantaneously buying one unit ( 1φ = ) on platform 2 and selling it 
instantaneously on platform 1 is given by: 
 
2,1
1, 2,t t tarbPL p p C= − −        [A. 1.1] 
 
Expanding Equation [A. 1.1] by following equations (1) to (9) and setting 
1, 1tx = −  (a 
sell in platform 1) and 
2, 1tx =  (a buy in platform 2) we have: 
 
2,1 1 2
1, 2,
2 2
t t t
c c
arbPL q q C
 = − − + − 
 
      [A.1.2] 
 
Substituting for 
1,tq  
and 
2,tq : 
 
2,1 1 2
1 1, 1 2 2, 1
2 2
t t t k t t
c c
arbPL m m b I b I C− − −= − − + − − −     [A.1.3] 
 
We can now expand 
t t k
m m −−  to show that it follows a weighted sum of both 
innovations. Starting with: 
 
t t k
m m −−          [A.1.4] 
 
Substituting for 
t
m : 
 
1t t t t km u mθν− −+ + −         [A.1.5] 
 
Substituting for 1tm − : 
 
2 1 1t t t t t t km u u mθν θν− − − −+ + + + −       [A.1.6] 
 
The pattern is already clear. Each substitution for 
t dm −  will give out 
1t d t d t dm uθν− − − −+ + . Therefore, recursively going back to time t-k we can show that: 
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1 1
0 0
k k
t t k t j t j
j j
m m u θ ν
− −
− − −
= =
− = +∑ ∑        [A.1.7] 
 
Using the last result in Equation [A.1.3] yields: 
 
1 1
2,1 1 2
1 1, 1 2 2, 1
0 0 2
k k
t t j t j t t
j j
c c
arbPL u b I b I Cθ ν
− −
− − − −
= =
+
= + − + − −∑ ∑    [A.1.8] 
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Appendix 2 - Expansion of the Inventory Equation 
The term 
1, 1tI −  is given by: 
 
1, 1 1, 2 1, 1t t tI I x− − −= −         [A.2.1] 
 
By substituting for the term 
1, 2tI −  we  have: 
 
1, 1 1, 3 1, 2 1, 1t t t tI I x x− − − −= − −        [A.2.2] 
 
Substituting again for 
1, 3tI − : 
 
1, 1 1, 4 1, 3 1, 2 1, 1t t t t tI I x x x− − − − −= − − −       [A.2.3] 
 
It is clear now that recursively substituting the inventory at time t-1 will be given by: 
 
1
1, 1 1,0 1,
1
t
t t j
j
I I x
−
− −
=
= −∑         [A.2.4] 
 
For the last equation, 
1,0I  is the inventory level at the beginning of the period and is 
equal to zero. Using this property and substituting for 
1,tx , we have: 
 
1
1, 1
1
t
t t j
j
I λ ν
−
− −
=
= − ∑         [A.2.5] 
 
Therefore, for platform 1, the inventory level at time t-1 can be represented as the 
negative cumulative sum of 
t jν − , weighted by λ .  
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Appendix 3 – Derivation of the Covariance between X and Y 
We are interested in calculating the covariance between the terms X and Y, which are 
given as follow: 
 
1 1
0 0
k k
t j t j
j j
X u θ ν
− −
− −
= =
= +∑ ∑        [A.3.1] 
( )( )
1
1 2
1
1
t
t j
j
Y b bλ λ ν
−
−
=
= − − ∑        [A.3.2] 
 
The covariance between both processes is calculated as: 
 
( ), [ ( )][ ( )]X Y E X E X Y E Yσ = − −       [A.3.3] 
 
Substituting [A.3.1] and [A.3.2] in [A.3.3] and using the property that  and  
( ) 0E Y =  yields: 
 
( )( )
1 1 1
, 1 2
0 0 1
] 1
k k t
X Y t j t j t j
j j j
E u b bσ θ ν λ λ ν
− − −
− − −
= = =
    
= + − −         
∑ ∑ ∑    [A.3.4] 
 
Notes now that 
t
u  and 
t
ν  are uncorrelated at any lag. Therefore, the term 
1
0
k
t j
j
u
−
−
=
∑  in 
[A.3.4] is redundant in the derivations as any interaction of 
t
u  and 
t
ν will be set to 
zero given that ( ) 0t i t jE u ν− − =  for any j and i. This simplifies last formula to: 
 
( )( )
1 1
, 1 2
0 1
] 1
k t
X Y t j t j
j j
E b bσ θ ν λ λ ν
− −
− −
= =
    
= − −         
∑ ∑     [A.3.5] 
 
 For Equation [A.3.5], see that some of the terms of both sums are the same. We can 
further simplifies last formula with: 
 
( )( )
1 1
, 1 2
1 1
] 1
k t
X Y t t j t j
j j
E b bσ θν θ ν λ λ ν
− −
− −
= =
    
= + − −         
∑ ∑    [A.3.6] 
 
( ) 0E X =
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Now, by assessing the property that ( ) 0t i t jE ν ν− − = , we can disregard any interaction 
of 
t i
ν −  with t jν −  for j i≠ since they will equal to zero once the expectations operation 
is applied. This operation yields: 
 
 ( )( )
1 1
, 1 2
1 1
] 1
k k
X Y t j t j
j j
E b bσ θ ν λ λ ν
− −
− −
= =
    
= − −         
∑ ∑     [A.3.7] 
 
Now, using the result that ( )2 2t i uE u σ− =  we can further simplify [A.3.7], leading us to 
the final result: 
 
( )( )( ) 2, 1 21 1X Y b b k νσ θ λ λ σ= − − −       [A.3.8] 
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Appendix 4 – Derivation of Cross Market Arbitrage Probability  
The result which we are interested in is the closed form solution for the probability of 
an arbitrage profit, irrespective of the trading platform. This will be given by: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )Pr 0 1 Pr | Pr |tarbPL X Y Z X Y Z> = − + ≤ − Ω + + ≤ Ω   [A.4.1] 
 
For last formula, the probability functions are the cumulative density function of a 
normal variable (X+Y) evaluated at Z. This will be given by: 
 
( )
2
1
Pr 1
2 2 X Y
Z
X Y Z erf
σ +
  −  + ≤ − = +
    
     [A.4.2] 
 
Substituting [A.4.2] in [A.4.1] we have: 
 
( )
2 2
1 1
Pr 0 1 1 1
2 22 2
t
X Y X Y
Z Z
arbPL erf erf
σ σ+ +
      −      > = − + + +
            
       [A.4.3] 
 
Simplifying last equation and noticing that ( ) ( )erf x erf x− = −  we have that: 
 
( )
( )2
Pr 0 1
2
t
X Y
Z
arbPL erf
σ +
 
 > = +   
 
     [A.4.4] 
 
Where: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2 2 21 2 1 21 1 1 2 1X Y uk b b b b t kν νσ σ θ σ λ λ σ λ λ θ+  = + + − − − − − + −   
( )( )1 1 22Z c c C−= − + +  
 
Expanding the error function in [A.4.4] we have the final result: 
 
 ( ) ( )2
0
2
Pr 0 1 exptarbPL t dt
ψ
π
> = + −∫      [A.4.5] 
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Where: 
( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )
1
1 2
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
2
2 1 1 1 2 1u
c c C
k b b b b t kν ν
ψ
σ θ σ λ λ σ λ λ θ
−− + +
=
 + + − − − − − + − 
      
